XenMobile: Usage of iPhone X FaceID feature


Is the iPhone X feature of FaceID supported in XenMobile?


Yes, FaceID authentication is supported with XenMobile. iPhone X FaceID uses the same APIs as the Touch ID feature in other iOS devices.


Will there be merge of both functions (Touch ID and FaceID), since it depends on the iPhone, which feature is used?


Since iPhone X FaceID uses the same APIs as the Touch ID feature in other iOS devices. So for iPhone X you will be prompted to use FaceID, and for other iOS devices you will be prompted to use TouchID. Since it depends on the iPhone, which feature is used (for Example iPhone 7 – TouchID, iPhone X – FaceID)


How will Secure Hub utilize the Face ID feature?


For the first time when Face ID is setup and we access Secure Hub, we are prompted if we want to use Face ID instead of PIN. If you select Yes, you can use Face ID for offline authentication every time instead of the PIN.


Will end users ever need to enter their PIN instead of the FaceID?


End users will still have to enter PIN whenever online authentication through NetScaler Gateway is required. This is required in the following instances:

  1. The user’s session has expired.
  2. The user reboots the device.
  3. ​Secure Hub is not currently running and the user launches it or an MDX app.


Will disabling or blocking camera create any issue with FaceID recognition?


FaceID uses a different API than the regular Camera APIs. It uses the same API for TouchID. The block camera policy will not block FaceID.


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Next terrorist attack with commercially available drones?

Feb. 23, 2018 / PRZen / AMSTERDAM, Netherlands — Violent non-state actors have increasingly been making use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) also known as drones. More recently, some terrorist organizations – among them, the Islamic State and Hezbollah – have extended their use of UAVs to include the deployment of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in warzones. Now, the threat of UAVs being used in attacks in Europe or North America is rising.

Commercial UAVs – considerably smaller and cheaper than military versions – have become widespread in industrialized societies. Their applications range from agriculture to the filming of sporting events. However, violent non-state actors have quickly learned how to adapt this technology to their advantage.

Sporting or music events could well be an optimal target, one that terrorists have repeatedly struck, or attempted to do so. The rationale behind terrorists’ interest in targeting sporting events is straightforward: they are mass events attended by large crowds in restricted spaces, and they attract a lot of media attention. Besides these soft targets also attacks on electrical grids, water supplies, chemical plants, nuclear facilities and last but not least: airports represent a further target. Countermeasures like geofencing, cyber warfare and drone-hunting eagles called “counter UAV technologies (C-UAV)” should decrease the likelihood of UAVs successfully approaching an airport or any other target.

Market Forecast‘s newest forecast report, Global Counter UAV (C-UAV) Systems Market Forecast to 2026, shows that a successful drone attack will create an immediate opportunity for companies selling counter UAV technology products and services. But only those companies that prepare for such an event will be able to take advantage of this business opportunity. Others will not have enough time to react before those sales go to their competitors.

Read more on MarketForecast.com

Follow the full story here: https://przen.com/pr/33238384

Source: Market Forecast


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Drones: NAF trains 20 officers in US, India on software, cyber security

By Joseph Erunke

ABUJA-AS it has begun production of indigenous operational Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs, the Nigerian Air Force said yesterday that it has trained a total of 20 of its officers both in India and the United States of America on how to handle them.

Nigerian Air Force

The officers were trained on software development and cyber security ahead of its recently launched Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UAV which it tagged ‘Tsaigumi.’

The Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar, who disclosed this during his opening remarks at a workshop organised for personnel of the Nigerian Air Force Communication Branch at the Air Force Headquarters, Abuja, said 12 personnel were trained as software developers in the US while eight others were trained in India on cyber security respectively.

According to him, “this became necessary to ensure effective service delivery with the ever-expanding Information and Communication Technology world.”

Abubakar, while adding that there were plans by his administration to train more personnel in the areas, said it all aimed at enabling the Nigerian Air Force “build capacity in embedded systems and micro controllers-components of the auto pilot for the locally developed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs.

He also said in line with one of the key drivers of his vision on human capacity development, the service had” embarked on several trainings for its personnel in software development, cyber security, communications, imagery analysis and maintenance of our navigational aids facilities.”

According to him, several local trainings had alsoy been conducted.

Hear him:”A total of 12 officers have been trained in the USA as software developers and eight others trained in India on cyber security and there are plans to train more.

“These would enable the NAF build capacity in embedded systems and micro controllers-components of the auto pilot for the locally developed UAVs.

“This became necessary to ensure effective service delivery with the ever-expanding lnformation and Communication Technology world.”

The Air Force chief, while noting that the workshop, being the first since the establishment of the Nigerian Air Force Communication Branch, was very important to the service as a fighting force, regretted what he called a graduate decline in expertise, skills and professionalism of the branch.

He attributed the regrettable development to the disengagement from service of the service highly trained personnel.

“Over the years, we have noticed a gradual decline in expertise, skills and professionalism of the branch personnel especially with the disengagement from service of our highly trained personnel.”

While noting that sophisticated equipment were in use today besides the technological advancement which he said, was quite rapid, he charged the Nigerian Air Force personnel to as a matter of necessity “be abreast with current developments if they are to remain relevant.”

“Modern warfare is technologically driven, hence the giant strides of the NAF towards infusing technology in its operations. In particular, the employment of information and communications technology is a strategic tool to enhance our operational and administrative processes, “he said.

Air Marshal Abubakar said the Nigerian Air Force had expanded communications with introduction of urban communications system and trained personnel on the basic maintenance of the cameras on its Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance, lSR platform.

” Navigational aids personnel are also being trained on airfield equipment system maintenance. These measures will save enormous foreign exchange needed to effect repairs abroad, “he further said.


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Proof’s in the Patent: Hacking, Jamming Drone That Can Destroy Itself After a Mission

Talk of drones that can hack air-gapped or isolated systems or devices has been going on for awhile.

Now, there is action, in the form of a 2018 patent request with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.


Electronic warfare and cyber effects? Now that will get your attention, won’t it?

I just finished reviewing the patent request, and the drone sounds and looks like a flying wing-type design that can silently travel up to 150 mph when needed, but also reduce to a “loiter speed” near a target for at least 30 minutes.


The scenario listed is one where Surface to Air Missiles threaten U.S. Air operations during a battle. The unmanned drone would silently fly its way to a site where a Surface to Air Missile is setup, and potentially jam its signal or deliver a harmful cyber payload.

Will the drone have enough juice in its hydrogen battery to get back to where it was launched? It is designed to crash to the ground as a clean machine.

Says the patent request: “One benefit of this type of EW (electronic warfare) payload is its ability to self-sanitize after use, which allows it to delete data, codes, and other information at the end of flight. Accordingly, after a mission has been completed, the SUAS 10 may be crashed into a ground surface without fear of an enemy gaining data carried by the EW payload.”

Who filed for this patent? Current Department of Defense contractor Selex Galileo. See the hacking drone patent request here.

This sounds like great technology if it’s on your side. But how long before hackers figure out something similar that can fly over open environments like refineries or dams?

The answer to that question is still up in the air.


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Why drones are the future of warfare

On January 5, something happened in Syria that will remain as a first in the history of warfare. Though it was not widely covered by the world media, it may prove to be a game changer. The website of Global Risk Insights reported that the Russian forces stationed in Syria suffered a case of swarm attack by drones. Despite the fact that the UAVs were rather crude, it was certainly a new development. What happened?

Russian bases

Two Russian military bases in Syria — one in Hmeymin and a logistic and supply base in Tartus — were targeted by a swarm of 13 GPS-guided drones carrying improvised explosives. While seven drones were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles, six were hacked by a cyberwarfare unit. Upon landing, three drones exploded causing extensive damage to Russian planes; three others were captured by Russian forces.

Quoting experts Global Risk Insights said, “Despite the attack itself not necessarily being spectacular by terrorist standards, this event heralds a near future where technologies like swarm drones will be increasingly employed by violent nonstate actors and terrorist organisations.”

The cost of a drone was estimated at 1,000 euros (Rs 75,000). In a recent issue on “The Future of War”, The Economist observed: “In the 19th century the speedy victory of the Prussian army over France in 1870 convinced European general staffs that rapid mobilisation by rail, quick-firing artillery and a focus on attack would make wars short and decisive.”

In the 1930s, strategists started believing that “aerial bombardment of cities would prove devastating enough to prompt almost immediate capitulation”. Then in 1990-91, America demonstrated during the first Gulf war what “a combination of its precision-guided munitions, new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance methods, space-based communications and stealth technology could achieve.”

Then September 11 took place and wars “took a different course”. The Economist’s report argued: “Potentially the biggest change to the way wars are fought will come from deploying lots of robots simultaneously.” It quoted Paul Scharre, an autonomous-weapons expert at Center for a New American Security, who has pioneered the concept of swarming: “Collectively, swarms of robotic systems have the potential for even more dramatic, disruptive change to military operations. Swarms can bring greater mass, co-ordination, intelligence and speed.”

There is no doubt that drones could leave the infantry jobless in a few decades from now. Does India realise this?

In October 2017, The South China Morning Post mentioned: “high-altitude spy drones could help China dominate ‘near space’ — a region of the Earth’s atmosphere that is at the heart of a modern-day space race.” Near space, which starts some 20km above sea level, has always been considered a “death zone” for drones: “Thin air at this altitude makes it hard to generate lift, while extremely low temperatures mean electronic components like batteries are prone to fail,” explained the Hong Kong newspaper, adding: “However, a new type of Chinese-developed drone that is undergoing testing appears to have overcome such difficulties.” Till then, the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk was the highest flying drone, having reached an altitude of 19km; that was before a Chinese research facility in Inner Mongolia successfully tested an experimental drone at an altitude of 25km.


Defence technology

Two months later, according to The Drive — researchers from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National University of Defence Technology (NUDT) conducted an experiment involving approximately two dozen of small fixed-wing unmanned aircrafts. Citing an official PLA publication, the website said: “The test consisted of the entire group of drones acting as a swarm to complete a simulated reconnaissance mission. The individual aircraft operated together as a single entity and performed certain unspecified portions of the flight autonomously.”

Shen Lin Cheng, the head of NUDT’s Institute of Artificial Intelligence Sciences, explained: “We have precise short, medium and long-term objectives, which are consistent with those set by the government on the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces by 2020, 2035 and 2050.”

Already in June 2017, the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation flew some 120 unmanned fixed-wing aircrafts; the entire formation acted either as one entity or in small groups breaking away with separate objectives.

US and China

The US is not left behind. In October 2016, the Department of Defense’s Strategic Capabilities Office tested with its Perdix a miniature air-dropped unmanned aircraft. Two months later, the US Department of Defence issued a communiqué announcing that one of the world’s largest micro-drone swarms had been successfully demonstrated at China Lake, California. Note the name “China Lake”!

The test conducted consisted of 103 Perdix drones launched from three F/A-18 Super Hornets. The micro-drones demonstrated “advanced swarm behaviours” such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing. The DoD release added: “The demonstration is one of the first examples of the Pentagon using teams of small, inexpensive, autonomous systems to perform missions once achieved only by large, expensive ones.”

Meanwhile, drones belonging to SF Express, China’s biggest private courier company, have been drafted by the PLA Air Force in Yunnan and Shaanxi provinces, to explore new kinds of logistics support. The South China Morning Post reported: “In the Yunnan drill, a company drone delivered urgently needed spare parts for a damaged radar in a rugged mountainous area in about an hour after the request was made, less than half the time it would have taken to truck in.” Whether it is for the state or non-state actors, the drones are here to stay and will be extensively used in future conflicts. The question is: what is India doing? Incidentally, China has not returned the Indian drone which accidentally fell in the Chumbi Valley.

(Courtesy of Mail Today)

Also read: 5 smartphones under Rs 35,000 that you should avoid buying


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Russian Operations, Exercises Have Better Integrated Electronic Warfare

Promotional photos of the Murmansk-BN system. Sputnik Photo

Russia has integrated electronic warfare and offensive and defensive electromagnetic spectrum capabilities into its operations and strategies, in a way not seen from NATO forces in Europe, a leading expert on the Kremlin’s armed forces said Monday.

Roger McDermott, a senior research fellow in war studies at King’s College London, said “the Russians learn by doing” and that they are taking lessons learned in Syria and Ukraine to heart. Citing their recent response to a drone swarm attack on a Russian air base and naval facility in Syria, he said, “all were brought down” by conventional air defense or jamming using electronic warfare tools.

In Ukraine, small electronic warfare units have previously crossed the border to jam the Kiev government’s communications or enhance the fire control of the separatists’ artillery, before pulling back to their own territory shortly after, McDermott said while speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

For the Kremlin, “there is an EMS [electro-magnetic spectrum] narrative” in southeastern Ukraine military operations. “They are gaining operational experience.”

In his recent report on electronic warfare, McDermott noted that Moscow had already begun the integration of its electronic warfare capabilities with conventional military hardware and software when it seized Crimea and Ukraine in 2014. Already in place in each motorized rifle brigade was an EW unit of 150 to 180 non-conscript soldiers engaged in planning and executing missions. In addition, each of the country’s five military districts had an EW element assigned to their headquarters, as do each of the armed forces.

McDermott said the United States and NATO do not have their armed forces organized in that way.

The idea, he said, is to integrate C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], A2/AD [anti-access/area denial], space, cyber and electronic warfare for offensive and defensive military effect. The Russian military has been at this reform in strategic thinking since 2008.

“What [President Vladimir] Putin did, he gave stability to the Russian armed forces” in funding, and has done so “consistently for the last few years.” This has allowed the armed forces to move promising projects out of research and development “to get these systems up and running.” He specifically mentioned an anti-communications satellite project that includes a strike system as one of the outgrowths of steady financing from the Kremlin.

Michael Kofman, a senior research scientist at CNA who also spoke at the CSIS event, said the Russians are “also investing in capacity and how they can spread it across the force” when it comes to EW, as well as harnessing new capability in force development, thought and future warfare strategy.

A screenshot from a Russian propaganda video of a Black Sea incident between a Su-24 Fencer and USS Donald Cook (DDG-74).

McDermott said the Russians are not 10-feet tall in this arena. He used the buzzing of destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) by a Sukhoi-24 in the Black Sea in 2014 as an example of exaggerating Russian prowess. Initial news accounts said that, not only did the aircraft come dangerously close to the vessel, but through a new electronic warfare system the Su-24 knocked out the destroyer’s radars and left its Aegis system inoperable.

“That’s mythology that built up,” he said.

Two years later, when the facts became much clearer, the Russian company that builds the electronic warfare system in question said it had never been mounted on a Su-24.

In the same light, McDermott said large military Russian exercises, the Zapad series, shouldn’t be viewed as training for an invasion of the Baltic nations or Poland; instead, it should be seen as what the Russian military would do in the event of NATO meddling in Belarus.

An undated photo of Russian President Vladimir Putin Russian Presidential Press and Information Office Photo

“When they look, they see an unpredictable actor [in NATO with] this appetite to intervene” outside of its area, McDermott said. The Zapad exercises are training to respond to that challenge from the West across the electromagnetic spectrum.

The question for Russian military planners, Kofman said, becomes “how do you achieve superiority” in situations like that. The answer: the Russians are working on asymmetric responses to expected challenges, McDermott added.

Later in the event, McDermott noted that NATO does not conduct any training on that scale, nor does it routinely include EW in its exercises.

“On its periphery, Russia has escalation dominance,” he said.



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‘Game-Changer’: Russian Battle Bot Development Could Eclipse US Program

The Russian military has been testing unmanned ground vehicles over the last few years, including the Nerekhta, the Uran-9, and the Vikhr, as reported by Business Insider.

The Nerekhta, a tracked unmanned ground vehicle, can be equipped with large-caliber machine guns, an AG-30M grenade launcher and anti-tank guided missiles.

The Uran-9 and Vikhr are heavier than the Nerekhta and operate like infantry fighting vehicles. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Nerekhta functioned better than other manned vehicles during training sessions.

In addition, Moscow has made great progress in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, known to be smaller and cheaper than US drones. According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the country’s unmanned aerial vehicles have flown 16,000 missions in Syria — equivalent to 96,000 hours of flight time.

The chairman of the Federation Council’s Defense and Security Committee, Viktor Bondarev, recently announced that Russia is studying the concept of drone “swarms” — defined as dozens or more drones operating as a single unit.

Noticing Russia’s recent improved electronic-warfare technologies, the US Army has stepped up its development of an electronic-warfare system to be integrated into a Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft system.

The Pentagon’s Integrated Electronic Warfare System will consist of the Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool, the Multi-Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW) capability and the Defensive Electronic Attack capability. The MFEW system is a multifunctional cyber, electronic warfare, communications intelligence, electronic intelligence and signal intelligence platform.

According to sources within the Pentagon, the development of autonomous combat drones “could be a game-changer,” cited by Defense One.

But the Kremlin is already a step ahead as, in early November, Bondarev announced that Russia plans to integrate artificial intelligence into military vehicles and combat operations, despite warnings by Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk that AI weaponry may cause a global arms race culminating in a third world war.

“The day is nearing when vehicles will get artificial intelligence. So why not entrust aviation or air defense to them?” Bondarev said.


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Assessing the Operational Environment: What We Learned Over the Past Year

Assessing the Operational Environment: What We Learned Over the Past Year

TRADOC G2 Operational Environment Assessment

This paper argues that fast-moving trends across the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) spheres are rapidly changing all aspects of society and human life, including the very character of warfare as TRADOC described in “The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare,” published in 2017. The convergence of these trends also reveals an erosion of U.S. military overmatch in several areas and set the stage for more aggressive challenges for the U.S.

This Operational Environment (OE) is dynamic and capable of changing when new drivers, new developments, and/or new trend lines are discerned, but changes to the whole OE construct will be rare. This does not mean that learning about the OE is a static process. TRADOC’s OE Enterprise is a learning enterprise that seeks to answer key questions and close critical OE knowledge gaps so that the Army can make the best decisions it can. Over the past year, TRADOC has learned a great deal more about the OE, but we have not changed our underlying assessment of the OE’s trajectory. There are critical lessons and insights that will influence the Army’s training and leader development, concept and doctrine development, and materiel acquisition efforts. We can categorize these critical lessons, or assessments, into four categories: general, tactical, operational, and strategic.

The general lessons we have learned over the past year confirm our OE analysis of trends and factors that intensify and accelerate the transformation of the future OE. The first trend is instability caused by demographics, identity issues, economic imbalances, competition for resources, climate change, and other issues that create fault lines within nations, regions, and broader international relations. The second trend is the rapid innovation, development, and fielding of new technologies that promise to radically enhance our abilities to live, create, think, and prosper. The factors that cut across these trends and bring them together are the accelerated pace of human interaction and widespread connectivity through the Internet of Things, and the concept of convergence. Convergence of societal trends and technologies will create new capabilities or societal implications that are greater than the sum of their individual parts, and at times are unexpected.

A consequence of convergence is a willingness by global actors to challenge U.S. interests. The perceived waning of U.S. military power in conjunction with the increase in capabilities resulting from our adversaries’ rapid proliferation of technology and increased investment in research and development has set the stage for challengers to pursue interests contrary to America’s.

  • We have seen adversaries directly attack our national will with cyber and sophisticated information operations while bypassing or metering any military attacks.
  • We will face peer, near-peer, and regional hegemons as adversaries, as well as non-state actors motivated by identity, ideology, or interest, and individuals super-empowered by technologies and capabilities once found only among nations.
  • Any area into which the Army will deploy between now and 2050 is expected to have instability that can be exploited either by U.S. Joint Forces or our adversaries. Fault lines in these areas generally include political disenfranchisement, economic disparity, and issues relating to identity.
  • Technologies in the future OE will be disruptive, smart, connected, and self-organizing.
  • Major cultural divides and gulfs in understanding will exist between individuals, interest groups, nations, and regions, which will create disparities and increase instability.
  • Key technologies once thought to be science fiction are here today, and are improving daily. They present new opportunities for military operations ranging from human operated / machine-assisted, to human-machine hybrid operations, to human-directed / machine- conducted operations; all facilitated by autonomy, Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, enhanced human performance, and advanced computing.

The tactical lessons we have learned reveal tangible realities found on battlefields around the globe today and our assessments about the future rooted in our understanding of the current OE.

  • Our adversaries already are using weapons and systems that in some cases are superior to our own, providing selective overmatch of some U.S. capabilities, such as long-range fires, air-defense, and electronic warfare.
  • We also have witnessed the use of commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) technologies to create new and novel methods of warfare.
  • Convergence, in particular, plays a role here as our adversaries often combine technologies or operating principles to create novel, and at times unique, methods of attack.
  • Our adversaries continue to make strides in developing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities. We must, at a tactical level, be prepared to operate in a CBRN environment.
  • Our potential adversaries are deploying complex combinations of capabilities that create unique challenges to the Army and Joint Forces. Adversaries, regardless of their resources, are finding ways to present us with multiple tactical dilemmas. Our adversaries are combining capabilities with new concepts and doctrine, as evidenced by:
    • Russia’s New Generation Warfare.
    • China’s active defensive and local wars under “informationized” conditions.
    • Iran’s focus on information operations, asymmetric warfare and anti-access/area denial.
    • North Korea’s combination of conventional, information operations, asymmetric, and strategic capabilities.
    • ISIS’s often improvised yet complex capabilities employed during the Battle of Mosul, in Syria, and elsewhere.
    • The proliferation of anti-armor capabilities seen in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, as well as the use of ballistic missiles by state and non-state actors.
  • Over the past year we have seen our adversaries field a number of new systems and technologies that have increased their capabilities. The most ubiquitous are drones and robotics that have been particularly successful in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine.
  • Our adversaries have excelled at Prototype Warfare, using new improvised capabilities that converge technologies and COTS systems—in some cases for specific attacks—to great effect. ISIS, for example, has used commercial drones fitted with 40mm grenades to attack U.S. and allied forces near Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqa, Syria. While these attacks caused little damage, a Russian drone dropping a thermite grenade caused the destruction of a Ukrainian arms depot at Balakleya, which resulted in massive explosions and fires, the evacuation of 23,000 citizens, and $1 billion worth of damage and lost ordnance.

The operational level lessons we have learned are teaching us that our traditional, and heretofore very successful, ways of waging warfare will not be enough to ensure victory on future battlefields. Commanders must now sequence battles and engagements beyond the traditional land, sea, and air domains, and seamlessly, and often simultaneously, orchestrate combat effects across multi-domains, to include space and cyberspace. The multiple tactical dilemmas that our adversaries present us with create operational level challenges. Adversaries:

  • Build increasingly sophisticated Anti-access/area denial “bubbles” we have to break.
  • Extend the scope of operations through the use of cyber, space, and asymmetric activities.
  • Simultaneously target individuals and segments of populations.
  • Complicate our operational deployment of forces.
  • Utilize sophisticated, and often deniable, methods of using information operations, often enabled by cyber capabilities, to directly target the Homeland and impact our individual and national will to fight.
  • Create the imperative to develop multi-domain capabilities.

We will have to operationalize Multi-Domain Battle to achieve victory over peer or near-peer competitors. Additionally, we must plan and be prepared to integrate other government entities and allies into our operations.

  • The dynamism of the future OE is driven by the ever increasing volumes of information. The importance of information operations will continue, and may become the primary focus of warfare/competition in the future.
  • When adversaries have a centralized leadership that can send a unified message and more readily adopt a whole-of-government approach, the U.S. needs mechanisms to more effectively coordinate and collaborate among whole-of-government partners.
  • Operations short of war may require the Department of Defense to subordinate itself to other Agencies, depending on the objective.
  • When coupled with sophisticated whole-of-government approaches, information operations, backed by new capabilities with increasing ranges, challenge our national approach to warfare.
  • Our adversaries’ asymmetric strategies blur the lines between war and competition, and operate in a gray zone between war and peace below the perceived threshold of U.S. military reaction.

The strategic lessons we have learned demonstrate the OE will be more challenging and dynamic then in the past.

  • A robust Homeland defense strategy will be imperative for competition from now to 2050.
  • North Korea’s strategic nuclear capability, if able to range beyond the Pacific theater to CONUS, places a renewed focus on weapons of mass destruction and missile defense.
  • A broader array of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction-armed adversaries will compel us to re-imagine operations in a CBRN environment, and to devise and consider new approaches to deterrence and collective security.
  • Our understanding of deterrence and coercion theory will be different from the lessons of the Cold War.
  • The Homeland will be an active theater in any future conflict and adversaries will have a host of kinetic and non-kinetic attack options from our home stations all the way to the combat zone.
  • The battlefield of the future will become far more lethal and destructive, and be contested from home station to the Joint Operational Area, requiring ways to sustain operations, and also to rapidly reconstitute combat losses of personnel and equipment.
  • The Army requires resilient smart installations capable of not only training, equipping, preparing, and caring for Soldiers, civilians, and families, but also efficiently and capably serving as the first point of power projection and to provide reach back capabilities.
  • Trends in demographics and climate change mean we will have to operate in areas we might have avoided in the past. These areas include cities and megacities, or whole new theaters, such as the Arctic.
  • Personalized warfare will increase over time, specifically targeting the brain, genomes, cultural and societal groups, individuals’ personal interests/lives, and familial ties.
  • Future conflicts will be characterized by AI vs AI (i.e., algorithm vs algorithm).
  • How AI is structured and integrated will be the strategic advantage, with the decisive edge accruing to the side with more autonomous decision-action concurrency on the “Hyperactive Battlefield.”
  • Due to the increasingly interconnected Internet of Everything and the proliferation of weapons with highly destructive capabilities to lower echelons, tactical actions will have strategic implications, putting even more strain and time-truncation on decision-making at all levels.
  • Cognitive biases can shape our actions despite unprecedented access to information.

Understanding the OE is perhaps more important now than ever. The future OE presents us with a combination of new technologies and societal changes that will intensify long-standing international rivalries, create new security dynamics, and foster instability as well as opportunities.

The Army recognizes the importance of this moment and is engaged in a modernization effort that rivals the intellectual momentum following the 1973 Starry Report. The Army’s intellectual momentum recognizes that the “big five” (i.e., M1 Abrams Tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter, UH-60 Black Hawk Utility Helicopter, and Patriot Air Defense System) had accompanying changes across leadership development and education, concept, and doctrine development that provided the U.S. Army overmatch into the new millennium.

Based on the future OE, the Army’s leadership is asking the important questions of what type of force do we need? What capabilities will it require? How will we prepare our Soldiers, civilians, and leaders to operate within this future? Clearly the OE is the starting point for this entire process.

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Tools to test new electronic weapons propel growth for Santa Rosa’s Keysight Technologies

About half of Keysight’s aerospace-defense market is overseas, such as India and Japan. Keysight sells some products to Russia and China despite their position as U.S. adversaries in some respects. The DOD restricts delivery of certain Keysight products to these countries, Peters said.

“We absolutely cannot sell to a certain small set of countries — North Korea and Iran,” Peters said. “We can sell commercial products to places like Russia and China that are appropriate under export control. There’s also a restricted party list,” such as people listed by the Obama administration when sanctions were imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and actions in Ukraine. “We wouldn’t have sold anything to them anyway,” Peters said. “We comply with all that.”

Selling a voltmeter, for instance, would not likely be controlled. “It’s not a threat to national security,” Peters said. “We are considered a defense company by the U.S. government because of some things we do.” The Department of Defense accounts for about 30 percent of Keysight’s aerospace-defense sales, with additional sales to domestic defense contractors.

Keysight’s aerospace-defense sales to other countries include allies. “New Zealand has a navy, and would need our equipment,” Peters said.

Electronic warfare has surged to the forefront in recent years. “There are domains of warfare,” Peters said. “Land, sea, air, space, cyber. Cyber is in or about the network — from the moment a radio wave touches your laptop and the laptop is connected to the Internet — that’s cyber. Electromagnetic-spectrum warfare is the sixth dimension of war.”

“It’s a cheap way to disrupt an enemy’s command-and-control. If you have a missile to take action against an adversary, the missile itself is a piece of hardware you have to protect. It has to have EW (electronic warfare) sensors on it to know that somebody is aiming for it to take evasive action.”

Using an electronic weapon is much less expensive than firing a missile, such as a ship-fired Rolling Airframe Missile or Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, to intercept an incoming missile.

A military airplane needs “sensors to give it 360 (degree) ability to see what’s going on, to protect plane and pilot,” Peters said. “The electromagnetic spectrum is something you want to control,” he said. “It’s critical to today’s connected battlefield. We’re not running cables. It needs to be protected and controlled.”

Identifying a threat quickly and accurately is vital. Gallium nitride, a compound of the soft silver-blue metal gallium, in radar substantially improves its range and sensitivity. Because gallium is used in smartphone technology, the material has become cheaper and more available.

In electronic warfare, “anywhere, anytime, any adversary can have access to that (gallium-nitride technology),” he said. “It makes defending really difficult. You are trying to disrupt the enemy, and they’re trying to disrupt you. It’s not a pleasant experience. It makes the test problem much harder than doing a cell phone.”

One Keysight simulator depicts a mock threat environment where a plane is flying using an electronic-warfare receiver to pick up radar from an airport, a destroyer and a helicopter. “It shows emissions from all those,” he said. “We emulate those emissions in real life. We send an RF signal out. That is used to test the EW receiver on an airplane. You bombard it with signals and figure out if it’s responding appropriately,” he said.


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NetScaler SD-WAN Virtual Path Unstable

Metering on the 4G link paths is turned on if there is at least 1 non-metered path that is in GOOD state. When this happens, metering is enabled on all paths on the 4G link and these paths are not used for control info. In other words, when at least 1 ADSL link path is in GOOD state, metering is enabled on the 4G link paths

while metering is enabled on the 4G link paths. If the quality of the ADSL link paths deteriorates to the point that the bandwidth on these paths is not sufficient for control info, the VP goes DEAD. Ss soon as the VP goes DEAD, the control plane disables metering, the 4G link paths are then used to send control info the VP goes back up.


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