Entry barrier for cyber crime is ‘shockingly low’

You might buy a SQL injection for an unpopular plugin.” According to Kolochenko, most of these publicly-traded goods and services are of poor quality. “Backdoors and Trojans are usually based on the same engine, slightly modified or improved. Stolen data is a mix of several dumps from different data …

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Cybersecurity can’t be seen in isolation, it has to be a concerted international effort, says ex-DHS …

“It first came to our attention on the morning of 10 July, 2010, when soon after my daily director’s briefing, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team watch officer informed me about a call we received from our partner agency in Germany about a malware sample they received that had some very unique characteristics,” recalls Seán McGurk — then director, Control Systems Security at the US Department of Homeland Security — about his first run-in with Stuxnet.

Sean McGurk

File image of Sean McGurk. Reuters

A couple of years after a 28- year-long stint with the US Navy, McGurk was in the role that put him in the eye of the Stuxnet storm. He would later be appointed director, National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Centre (NCCIC) at the DHS, before moving to the private sector. Now, over seven years since his run-in with Stuxnet, McGurk serves as a senior policy advisor at the Industrial Control System Information Sharing and Analysis Centre.

While Iran bore the greatest brunt of Stuxnet in losing nearly 1,000 of its 6,000 centrifuges in its Natanz power plant, such countries as Indonesia, India, Azerbaijan, the US, Pakistan and a handful of others also felt its wrath. Stuxnet’s emergence — as a worm that targeted Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA for short) systems — marked a watershed moment in global security.

Stuxnet

“With the release of malware specifically targeting industrial control systems, we moved into a new domain of cyber-risk,” explains McGurk, adding, “Before Stuxnet, the main focus of information security was on enterprise networks and business and personal information. Most of the concern was on theft and fraud and not on destroying physical systems through cyber means.” The situation changed markedly in the era in the post-Stuxnet world, where he notes an increase in physical attacks not only for the purposes of government-sponsored activity but also for commercial purposes and financial gain. The part about ‘physical attacks’ is important because it’s worth keeping in mind, Stuxnet wasn’t simply stealing information or manipulating data in the cyber-realm; it had jumped out into the real world where it was actually causing physical harm to systems.

But let’s get back to 10 July, 2010.

After the call with the German partner agency, it began to send McGurk’s team a sample with some initial analysis. “I asked why the malware team of the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) was not taking the lead. That’s when I was informed that the malware in question appeared to be infecting control systems, so the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) CERT had the lead,” he notes, “I left directions to notify me when the sample was received, and work was started on the analysis. And we began our tracking process to document the activity.”

Having shared samples with partners, domestic and international, both ICS-CERT and US-CERT personnel started malware analysis. “Once the work began, we forwarded a sample of the code to our Control Systems Security Lab for additional analysis and review. I received a call from the malware team at approximately 4 pm that day that this was a very sophisticated piece of malware that appeared to be targeting a specific manufacturer of industrial control systems,” says McGurk. As it would later transpire, the manufacturer was Siemens.

“Unfortunately,” he adds, “Progress was delayed due to the use of enhanced encryption in the code that would require further analysis. By midday on 12 July, we began to understand the extent and possible impact of this type of malware attacking control system networks.” It was five days later, that ICS-CERT published the first public notification on the malwareand its potential impact.” From this point on, internal briefings with government, industry and international partners commenced with daily updates on the status of analysis.

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visits the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. Image: Reuters

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visits the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. Image: Reuters

Whodunnit?

Over the years, reports have emerged indicating that the US and Israel were responsible for the creation of Stuxnet, that it was a weapon that emerged from a cyber strategy devised by George W Bush and accelerated by his successor Barack Obama and so on.

Comments? “Although there is much speculation as far as the origin and the intent of the malware there has never been any indicators in the code to attribute it to a specific group, groups or nation-state,” the former US Navy command master chief told Firstpost, adding, “Keep in mind, Stuxnet was one of the most sophisticated and advanced pieces of malware discovered at that time.”

McGurk puts the sophistication of Stuxnet into perspective in five points:

  • First, Stuxnet made use of four significant zero-day vulnerabilities. Most malware uses existing vulnerabilities or may exploit a single zero-day vulnerability.
  • Second, two Stuxnet variants each used a different digital certificate ‘taken’ from technology companies located at the Hsinchu Technology Park (Taiwan). These were ‘valid’ software certificates attesting to the authentication of the code.
  • Third, with over 4,000 functions, Stuxnet contains as much code as some commercial software products.
  • Fourth, Stuxnet used many advanced programming techniques that demonstrate advanced knowledge in many areas including anti-virus and network communications protocols.
  • And fifth, it used a sophisticated infection and data exfiltration method previous not identified in other malware samples.

Cyberweapons of today

If all of this sounds frightening, it’s worth bearing in mind that Stuxnet happened a whole seven-plus years ago. Offensive cyber capabilities globally have come a long way since then. “Today, as a result of Stuxnet, we see not only the capability to disrupt business but the desire to do so. There are numerous examples of malware campaigns such as Shamoon, Mahdi, Duqu, Flame, Skywiper, Black Energy and Petya/Notpetya that are designed to deny, disrupt and destroy your ability to conduct business and deliver goods and services,” points out McGurk.

As a people, we aren’t naïve enough to imagine this sort of thing only belongs in the world of sci-fi anymore. However, like most of the best sci-fi, there’s plenty of room for things to be much worse. “With the recent identification of the Hatman/Trisis/Triton malware that targets safety systems, we have moved into a new era of risk to critical infrastructure and life and safety,” explains McGurk somewhat ominously.

According to the NCCIC, the job of safety systems in critical infrastructure is to “provide a way for a process to safely shut down when it has encountered unsafe operating conditions, and provide a high degree of safety and reliability with important monitoring capabilities for process engineers”. Take that away and what you’re left with is an immensely dangerous scenario. The key aspect of safety systems is that they are designed in a manner that even if they were to fail, the manner of failure would be entirely predictable. Worst-case scenarios are usually known and importantly, predictable. Take away the safety net of the ability to anticipate and what you’re left with is an immensely dangerous situation.

On cyberwar

Swindling a few million dollars from a major multinational is one thing, but sabotaging the safety systems of critical infrastructure like a power plant or air traffic control — and putting the lives of potentially millions of innocent people — is another altogether. It’s here that a crucial question needs to be asked: How do you draw the line between an act of cybercrime and cyberwar?

“It is difficult to distinguish between the two but perhaps a distinguishing factor may be for financial gain as opposed to a national or economic advantage,” offers McGurk, “Nation-states or nation-state-sponsored criminal activity may utilise the same tools, techniques and procedures (TTPS) but for different purposes or outcomes.”

He continues, “I support a global approach to cyber activity, however, lacking clear definitions on what constitutes a cyber act of war makes developing a protocol or convention difficult.”

In ‘Laws of War: Opening of hostilities’ under the Hague Convention of 1909, war must be declared — “The contracting powers recognise that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war,” as per Article 1 — and other nation-states must be made aware of the state of war — “The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification,” as per Article 2. When at war, the Geneva Convention and International Humanitarian Law governs all the acts contained within the said state of war, including the idea that non-combatants and civilians may not be targeted.

But how on earth do you govern something like cyber war, that by its nature is covert, unspoken and largely targets non-combatants? Bear in mind, cyber weapons work best when they are unleashed without warning and attribution (ie pinpointing the source of an attack) is still far from accurate. Does this mean then that we need to assume we are permanently in a state of war with one and all in cyberspace?

“The Geneva Convention addresses conduct during wartime actions,” acknowledges McGurk and offers, “We require a more comprehensive approach that extends to normal online activity. There is a place for a digital Geneva Convention to address wartime activity, however, we need something that applies day-to-day.”

As of the time of writing, there is neither consensus nor a clear idea of what that will look like and there isn’t reason to be optimistic that there’s such a document on the horizon, what with nation-states rarely even acknowledging their own offensive cyber capabilities, leave alone discussing them with other nation-states.

What nation-states should do

“In order to move forward, a directed public/private partnership is necessary,” says McGurk. It’s no secret that private players are far more proactive than the public sector in most countries and that government red tape frequently slows down the speed of development. “Governments, internationally, must develop a framework for cyber systems, communications, connectivity and security. The private sector must work with the framework to develop ‘secure by design’ systems and mitigate the risk associated with legacy-based systems,” he adds. This, it is believed, will provide a way to address gaps and close vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure.

The world learned its collective lesson about the perils of atomic bombs after the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As of 2018, while countries have built and strengthened nuclear capabilities, not one nuclear weapon has been used by one nation-state against another in the 73 intervening years. Could the same happen with cyberweapons?

“I do not believe we need a digital major disaster in order for governments and industries to understand and address the threats that cyber warfare may pose. We are all raising the level of awareness within our respective areas,” says McGurk. It’s worth recalling at this point, a statement made by the former DHS man back at a Senate hearing in April 2011. He had said, “No single agency has sole responsibility for securing cyberspace, and the success of our cybersecurity mission relies on effective communication and critical partnerships.”

Globally, it stands to reason that this should apply to governments across the world when it comes to securing cyberspace. Needless to say, that isn’t something that’s happening. “My concern is that we are taking a limited national approach as opposed to a global approach. No one government agency or private sector company will be able to solve the problem. It will take the coordinated effort of the global community in order to properly address the risk,” says McGurk and offers a sliver of encouragement, “Simply because of the installed base and infrastructure investments India has made, it is in a position to lead that effort on a scale that other nations cannot match.”

He elaborates, “Numerous reports cite India as the largest connected country globally. From digital identity, digital banking and data usage, India is ideally positioned to provide worldwide leadership in the digital era.”

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Stuxnet – Cyber Warfare

Stuxnet – Cyber Warfare. Join me on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/Sentientmind Protected under the Creative Commons License for re-use. All credit goes to: Direction and Motion Graphics: Patrick Clair Written by: Scott Mitchell

Tags: Stuxnet – Cyber Warfare, stuxnet, virus, code, lebron, james, computer, hacking

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Stuxnet – Cyber Warfare

Stuxnet – Cyber Warfare. Join me on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/Sentientmind Protected under the Creative Commons License for re-use. All credit goes to: Direction and Motion Graphics: Patrick Clair Written by: Scott Mitchell

Tags: Stuxnet – Cyber Warfare, stuxnet, virus, code, lebron, james, computer, hacking

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After US, now UK proposes ban on Kaspersky Labs products

Kaspersky
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Seems like bad luck Brian is not going to leave Moscow-based cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Labs anytime soon. After the clamor at the United States Senate and the following ban in the nation, Britain’s cybersecurity agency has warned government departments to refrain from using antivirus software from Kaspersky Labs citing concerns over the company’s ties to the Kremlin and Russian spy operations.

In a letter addressed to the head honchos of several civil service departments, Ciaran Martin, head of the National Cyber Security Centre has stated that, “The specific country we are highlighting in this package of guidance is Russia. As the Prime Minister’s Guildhall speech set out, Russia is acting against the UK’s national interest in cyberspace. The NCSC advises that Russia is a highly capable cyber threat actor which uses cyber as a tool of statecraft. This includes espionage, disruption and influence operations. Russia has the intent to target UK central Government and the UK’s critical national infrastructure.”

According to him, the overwhelming majority of UK individuals and organizations, “are far more likely to be targeted by cyber criminals.” But the best of the interests, “we advise that where it is assessed that access to the information by the Russian state would be a risk to national security, a Russia-based AV (anti-virus) company should not be chosen.”

Earlier this year, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen had pressed for a federal government-wide ban of all Kaspersky Lab products in U.S. Shaheen cited that intelligence officials during a public hearing had stated that they weren’t comfortable with using Kaspersky Lab software in computers at the intelligence agencies. Adding, “Americans were outraged by Russia’s interference in our presidential election, but a wider threat is Russia’s doctrine of hybrid warfare, which includes cybersabotage of critical American infrastructure from nuclear plants to electrical grids. Kaspersky Lab, with an active presence in millions of computer systems in the United States, is capable of playing a powerful role in such an assault. It’s time to put a stop to this threat to our national security.”

Following which, Kaspersky Labs admitted taking inactive files in pursuit of hackers. While claiming that “we did nothing wrong”, Eugene Kaspersky in an interview said “the files containing the National Security Agency (NSA) hacking tools were taken because they were part of a larger file that included suspicious software, a tool researchers dubbed GrayFish. Such actions occur only in very, very, very rare cases.”

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News Feature. Case for the defence – Eugene Kaspersky – not a spy?

News Feature. Case for the defence - Eugene Kaspersky - not a spy?
News Feature. Case for the defence – Eugene Kaspersky – not a spy?

In a two-pronged charm offensive Kaspersky Labs, and Eugene Kaspersky in particular, held two consecutive events yesterday to bolster the company’s position as a reliable and responsible contributor to global cyber-security – and specifically defend against charges that the company and its founder are in some way agents of the Russian state.

First came a cross-industry panel on Ransomware aimed at ensuring an informed, realistic public understanding of the threat, achieving a balance to foster concern, without spilling over to paralysed fear, and then informing what they might do about it so as to feel empowered to act.

Then came Eugene Kaspersky’s defence against what he described as a coordinated US media and government attack designed and orchestrated, with money and lobbyists, commenting that, ”The scale of this attack means there is some very big money behind it.”

The attack referred to is the reports that Kaspersky products were used to expose NSA hacking tools, leading to a US government ban on the use of Kaspersky products, and extensive subsequent negative reporting of the issue, capitalised on by competitors. So much so that Kaspersky told reporters it has had a negative impact of between minus five or minus eight percent on revenue compared to the previous year in the US & Canada while it was experiencing double digit growth in rest of world apart from Western Europe where it was zero growth. With some US$ 700 million of global revenue, of which 25 percent is in the US, that puts the impact of the negative press at up to US$ 14 million in the past year.

UK national press and international agencies were tough in their questioning, pressing with repeat questions along the lines of, “You were trained by the KGB and served in the military. They say, once in the KGB, always in the KGB. If you are leaned on by the FSB (Russia’s successor to the USSR’s KGB), surely you can’t refuse working for them? Have you provided products and services for the Russian intelligence agencies such as the FSB, have you ever spied for them? Have you ever been asked to spy for them?

Kaspersky responded that his company does assist law enforcement around the world, so it does supply such services to UK counter-criminal intelligence, and the FSB’s anti-criminal activity. But he was adamant that, “We never helped espionage agencies. We’ve never been asked by the Russian government for intelligence, apart from [in relation to] defence from particular attacks. And we only share information if the device is within Russian borders, not if it’s held outside.

“The FSB never asked us to spy. I have been asked in other countries, not Russia, to take more offensive action and I ended the conversation. I stay on the defensive part.

“If Russia asks me to spy I will move the business out of Russia.”

“We don’t do anything wrong. We just do our job much better than our competitors and I am not going to change our behaviour, and these media attacks will never stop us.”

Kaspersky acknowledged that it was a fact that his education was at a KGB college studying cryptography and that is now a cryptographic academy, then he worked as a software engineer for the Russian Military “not even a cryptographer.”

He emphasised, “We are providing our tech and services to fight malware and stop attacks, not to spy on our customers.”

Kaspersky characterised the current controversy as ‘The code wars episode 2′, with episode one being the attacks in 2012 based on Kaspersky having a Moscow office and using a sauna, with accusations he insists were, “Not facts, just opinions, with no hard data.”

This year there have been FBI visits to employees in the US and visits to partners in the US “spreading rumours and wrong information about the company,” and while there has been no action since the second week of October, Kaspersky says the company is still feeling the negative impact.”

“It was a big surprise for me when we were facing such a Tsunami of negative press.” He went on to ask, what are reasons for this media assault? One by one he considered and dismissed possible explanations, including general global geopolitical turbulence, internal US political turbulence to use against the NSA, “but we are not big enough to have that impact.”

The possibility of it being due to competitors was considered, noting the 2010/2011 attacks on China’s Huawei, when seeking to launch national broadband in Australia, it was claimed its products had backdoors, working for China, CISCO won the contract and no backdoors were found. But Kaspersky contracts are not the same size.

Other theories were that it could be a combination of all that, or something not known or understood, or, in Kaspersky’s words, “Because we are the best.”

Kaspersky said that while there was perhaps 80 percent factual information in the reports, a further 20 percent untrue information was responsible for the negative spin. He acknowledged, “We assist Russian intelligence to fight cyber-crime and conduct international investigation of cyber crime – which is undertaken by the FSB into cyber-gangs. We assist them, provide technical information, the logic of malware etc. We are working with national and international law enforcement including say the UK. But the use of word Russian, makes it appear as if we were a contractor for FSB espionage – and that’s not true. Some of our guys may follow agents on arrests, it’s true, because they need our specialist support on these. Most probably the FSB uses our products, the same as are used in the rest of world.”

The big argument in Kaspersky’s favour is the lack of evidence to the contrary. As Kaspersky points out, “Its possible to check what we do. As we communicate with our customers, we distribute the same code for the whole world so professionals can download, unpack and read it, so in 20 years, they’ve found nothing wrong with our products and services. They do unpack it, I’m sure, as its possible – we don’t do any tricks to hide the functionality.”

To reinforce this argument, the company is undertaking a global transparency initiative with transparency centres in Europe, the US and Asia, which will have Kaspersky’s source code, date and history of updates etc for respective governments and agencies to inspect and review. It will also start a bug bounty programme to find any errors in its code or updates.

Kaspersky also reiterated the history of the Equation group (NSA hackers) tools found by Kaspersky, again emphasising that it was only found twice and it was deleted – having run for a week after the Kaspersky products were reactivated by the unknown user. But as Der Spiegel already reported on this being US state sponsored malware and shadow borkers released them, this was not viewed as the main cause. Another possible reason cited was the August 2016 discovery by Kaspersky of the native English- speaking malware Remsec/Project Sauron, a massive infection impacting many Russian government departments.

SC Media UK asked Eugene Kaspersky if, given that technically the Kaspersky products could be misused, and the Russian government could theoretically exert pressure, was it not just prudent risk reduction for the US government to ban the use of Kaspersky products and services. Kaspersky responded, “ I can respect if the US government decides not to make our product available for US government – and we have almost zero [installations] in the US government and its agencies. But with us it’s not just made about not being used in government, it’s about the media, making [a negative impact] in the market and impacting [Kaspersky’s] businesses.”

He went on to note how software is now international – the software running our phones or our power stations could be made anywhere in the world and is unlikely to have been made in our own country. “Software can be made anywhere. Our transparency centre, opening the source code, shows we are not afraid of others inspecting it. Others looking at it will cry.”

It is policy, but journalists did point out that ultimately it is it down do Eugene Kaspersky to implement the policy that if classified information is found , it must be deleted. “We have had that twice in 20 years,” he added.

Ultimately, however, it comes down to human discretion and trust. Kaspersky acknowledged, that if US employees found classified information, it wasn’t possible to guarantee they will delete it (and by implication, if Russian employees found classified information), but the instruction is to do so.

………………………………….

Eugene Kaspersky kicked off by explaining how over the last couple of years ransomware has become one of the most visible cyber-security problems, with Wannacry the first network worm for nine years, since Conflicker.

“No such vulnerability in network protocols had been seen for nine years. It allowed a combination of pandemics, with ransomware and cyber-warfare tools in the same package, thus it was such a big shock. This very effective self-replicating malware combined with cyber-warfare is just an indicator and enabler for other ransomware gangs to ‘improve their business’ so it’s an example for the bad guys of what can happen. They are improving their skills,” warned Kaspersky.

He added that it’s not just a tool to encrypt – it’s the logic behind it – send a phishing email, look for online bank accounts, and if found, steal from them, and if they are not found, give control to the ransomware.

“So it has different malware for the two scenarios. Thus it has business logic; it’s not just stupid guys doing a bad job – its smart guys who are criminals behind this new generation of malware.”

It was suggested that in the future ransomware will have a massive impact on physical infrastructure as the next generation of ransomware will be optimised to deliver targeted attacks on infrastructure and will have a visible impact on physical ifnrastruture.

Samani added that ransowmware has already been shown to have an impact on real life – with 6,312 medical procedures impacted by a piece of code in the WannaCry attack, and even turning off of internet access for patients had a negative impact. These examples, “Show that this is not an IT issue. We are dependent on technology,” adding that the founding of NoMoreRansom was when society stood up and said, No more. And it has subsequently saved millions of pounds of potential losses.

It was reported that ransomware a quarter of Ransomware attacks are on business, and three quarters on consumers, but most people do not think they are likely to be hit.

Martiz agreed that there was growing awareness of what Ransomware is, but a big problem is to have a coherent message of what it is and what you do to protect yourselves. She commented, “People switch off if they think it’s highly technical, but here are some basic things you can do to protect yourself. They get so confused as to what is real and what isn’t they do nothing.

It was also noted that an important aim is not just to protect the businesses, but also to ruin the bad guys’ business. Technology has made it easy for them. We need to make it less economic and put a greater threat on their liberty.

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Grant Bosse: Shaheen sounded the alarm on Kaspersky

By GRANT BOSSE

November 20. 2017 10:14PM



The only thing I knew about Kaspersky Lab was that it used to sponsor the New England Patriots’ radio broadcast.

That was until this summer, when New Hampshire Sen. Jeanne Shaheen started ringing alarm bells about the anti-virus software company.

Shaheen sits on a Senate Homeland Security subcommittee that received a classified report on Russian interference in the 2016 elections. Shaheen can’t share everything she knows, but there has been enough publicly-reported smoke for Shaheen to call for putting out the fire.

Shaheen explains that under Russian law, “all information in and out of Russia is subject to surveillance, including digital info.”

Since Kaspersky’s servers are in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s government has a back door into all that data. U.S. government agencies had left that door wide open.

“About 15 percent of government agencies detected Kaspersky software on their networks, including the Department of Defense,” Shaheen says.

Was this just a Russian firm forced to give Putin’s government access to comply with Russian law? Shaheen says no.

“There are open-source reports of top Kaspersky officials working with Russian intelligence, the FSB,” Shaheen says, while not commenting on her classified briefings.

In June, she was the first public official to claim direct links between Kaspersky and the Russian government.

Last month, the New York Times reported Israeli spies had hacked into Kaspersky, and found Russian hackers had been exploiting the Kaspersky back door to gain sensitive intelligence. The Washington Post reported the Kaspersky network had hacking tools from the U.S. National Security Agency, which were later traced to the Kremlin.

In June, Shaheen introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to ban Kaspersky products from defense department computers. Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain not only joined her effort, but joined in a broader push for a ban across all federal government computers.

Shaheen and McCain’s language was incorporated into the NDAA, with remarkably little debate.

As the bill was working its way across Capitol Hill, the Trump administration began to respond. In July, the General Services Administration delisted Kaspersky from the list of approved products for government use. In September, nine days after a Shaheen op-ed on the Kaspersky threat ran in the New York Times, the Department of Homeland Security banned the entire federal government from using Kaspersky products.

Last week, the NDAA sailed through the House and Senate, and is headed to President Trump’s desk to be signed into law. Shaheen’s amendment, now applying to every federal computer, is included.

It is a big win for a senator who staked out a small, but important issue, and worked across party lines to build consensus.

I asked Shaheen if she was frustrated that she was barred from sharing the evidence that convinced her Kaspersky was a threat.

“This is a long-standing problem that we have with our federal government. Classified information sharing has been challenging at best,” she responded.

A key section of Shaheen’s amendment requires the DOD to report on its own capacity to spot and address cyberthreats such as Kaspersky. It also requires a version of this report to be unclassified.

“We know that Russia has a theory of warfare that includes cyberwarfare. We saw that in Ukraine. We saw that in Georgia,” Shaheen says. “We just saw for example that Russia interfered in Spain to inflame the Catalonia separatist movement. The goal of the Putin government is to undermine the West’s faith in our democratic institutions, and this is a piece of that.”

Putin, like his Soviet predecessors, wants to encourage chaos in the U.S. and other Western democracies. This very real threat is conflated by some on the left with groundless theories that Russian interference somehow stole the election from Hillary Clinton. Such theories play right into Putin’s hands.

So does dismissing the threat, or mistaking Putin’s efforts to undermine Clinton as evidence of allegiance with Trump. The President and many of his supporters can’t bring themselves to see this.

Kaspersky, wittingly or not, was one tool Putin used to steal our secrets. Kudos to Jeanne Shaheen for shutting it down.

Grant Bosse is editorial page editor of the New Hampshire Union Leader and Sunday News.


BusinessPoliticsTechnologyGrant Bosse

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Re: XCP Deployment Failure

Hi All,

When we deploying the xcp application we getting attached error.

We are working on xcp 2.3.

If any one faced below. Please help us.

[ERROR] Repository deployment failed

[ERROR] com.emc.xcp.installer.ApplicationInstallException: Failed to create dmc_module for artifact ‘WorkflowUtilImpl’

[ERROR] com.emc.xcp.installer.ArtifactBundleInstallException: com.emc.xcp.installer.ApplicationInstallException: Failed to create dmc_module for artifact ‘WorkflowUtilImpl’

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.install(DarInstaller.java:224)

[ERROR] at internal.com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.deployers.RepositoryDeployer.runDarInstall(RepositoryDeployer.java:212)

[ERROR] at internal.com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.deployers.RepositoryDeployer.runInstall(RepositoryDeployer.java:191)

[ERROR] at internal.com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.deployers.RepositoryDeployer.deploy(RepositoryDeployer.java:116)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.AppDeployerNodeService$DEPLOY_PHASE$1.doPhase(AppDeployerNodeService.java:30)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.AppDeployerNodeService$1.call(AppDeployerNodeService.java:98)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.AppDeployerNodeService$1.call(AppDeployerNodeService.java:1)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.run(FutureTask.java:262)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor.runWorker(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:1145)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor$Worker.run(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:615)

[ERROR] at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:744)

[ERROR] Caused by: java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException: com.emc.xcp.installer.ApplicationInstallException: Failed to create dmc_module for artifact ‘WorkflowUtilImpl’

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.report(FutureTask.java:122)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.get(FutureTask.java:188)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.threadedInstall(DarInstaller.java:495)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.installNonTypes(DarInstaller.java:485)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.runBasicInstall(DarInstaller.java:479)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.install(DarInstaller.java:215)

[ERROR] … 10 more

[ERROR] Caused by: com.emc.xcp.installer.ApplicationInstallException: Failed to create dmc_module for artifact ‘WorkflowUtilImpl’

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.artifact.javamodule.install.JavaModuleRespositoryInstaller.create(JavaModuleRespositoryInstaller.java:57)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.install(ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.java:119)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.run(ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.java:70)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.call(ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.java:15)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.call(ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.java:1)

[ERROR] … 4 more

[ERROR] Caused by: DfPathNotFoundException:: THREAD: pool-160-thread-18; MSG: [DM_API_E_EXIST]error: “Folder specified by /System/Modules/edmapp/edmapp_workflowutilimpl does not exist.”; ERRORCODE: 100; NEXT: null

[ERROR] at com.documentum.fc.client.impl.session.Session.getFolderBySpecification(Session.java:1296)

[ERROR] at com.documentum.fc.client.impl.session.SessionHandle.getFolderBySpecification(SessionHandle.java:835)

[ERROR] at com.documentum.fc.client.DfSysObject.doLink(DfSysObject.java:1228)

[ERROR] at com.documentum.fc.bof.bootstrap.DfModuleItemChangeMonitor.doLink(DfModuleItemChangeMonitor.java:30)

[ERROR] at com.documentum.fc.client.DfSysObject.link(DfSysObject.java:1212)

[ERROR] at com.documentum.fc.client.DfDocument___PROXY.link(DfDocument___PROXY.java)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.artifact.javamodule.install.BOFModuleUtils.createDmcJar(BOFModuleUtils.java:186)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.artifact.javamodule.install.BOFModuleUtils.createOrUpdateJar(BOFModuleUtils.java:171)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.artifact.javamodule.install.BOFModuleUtils.updateStandardBOFModule(BOFModuleUtils.java:103)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.artifact.javamodule.install.JavaModuleRespositoryInstaller.create(JavaModuleRespositoryInstaller.java:50)

[ERROR] … 8 more

[ERROR] com.emc.xcp.installer.ApplicationInstallException: Failed to create dmc_module for artifact ‘WorkflowUtilImpl’

[ERROR] java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException: com.emc.xcp.installer.ApplicationInstallException: Failed to create dmc_module for artifact ‘WorkflowUtilImpl’

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.report(FutureTask.java:122)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.get(FutureTask.java:188)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.threadedInstall(DarInstaller.java:495)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.installNonTypes(DarInstaller.java:485)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.runBasicInstall(DarInstaller.java:479)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.DarInstaller.install(DarInstaller.java:215)

[ERROR] at internal.com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.deployers.RepositoryDeployer.runDarInstall(RepositoryDeployer.java:212)

[ERROR] at internal.com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.deployers.RepositoryDeployer.runInstall(RepositoryDeployer.java:191)

[ERROR] at internal.com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.deployers.RepositoryDeployer.deploy(RepositoryDeployer.java:116)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.AppDeployerNodeService$DEPLOY_PHASE$1.doPhase(AppDeployerNodeService.java:30)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.AppDeployerNodeService$1.call(AppDeployerNodeService.java:98)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.builder.deployment.AppDeployerNodeService$1.call(AppDeployerNodeService.java:1)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.run(FutureTask.java:262)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor.runWorker(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:1145)

[ERROR] at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor$Worker.run(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:615)

[ERROR] at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:744)

[ERROR] Caused by: com.emc.xcp.installer.ApplicationInstallException: Failed to create dmc_module for artifact ‘WorkflowUtilImpl’

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.artifact.javamodule.install.JavaModuleRespositoryInstaller.create(JavaModuleRespositoryInstaller.java:57)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.install(ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.java:119)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.run(ArtifactBasicInstallRunner.java:70)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.call(ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.java:15)

[ERROR] at com.emc.xcp.installer.internal.ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.call(ArtifactBasicInstallCallable.java:1)

[ERROR] … 4 more

Regards,

Krishnasami

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